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Emotion, Interaction and the Structure-Agency Problem: 
building on the sociology of Randall Collins 
Anthony King 
 
Introduction 
Today, sociology is in crisis. Having established itself as an independent discipline in western 
universities about a century ago, sociology has declined in institutional prominence and 
intellectual influence. This crisis itself a partial response to three external intellectual threats. 
Firstly, exploiting new findings in neuroscience and genetics, evolutionary psychologists 
have sought to reduce human social behaviour to biological, evolutionary adaptation.  
Secondly, sociology is under assault from individualism, an eternal opponent. Of course, 
individualism is most forcefully represented in economy theory with rational choice theory 
which possesses a long-standing challenge to sociology. However, ironically, sociologist 
have themselves adopted an increasingly individualist perspective in their own work in the 
last three decades, focusing on individual and, in fact, personal perceptions, actions and 
emotions as the prime locus of investigation and, indeed, explanation. Finally, sociology is 
under attack from things themselves. Technological determinism has always been a current in 
sociology. However, sociologists have now explicitly sought to de-throne the special status of 
the human social relation or social interaction with a re-orientation on material objects. Of 
course, Bruno Latour’s work is at the forefront here. His oeuvre is predicated on a rejection 
of classical, collectivist sociology in the form of Emile Durkheim and a putative revaluation 
of the individualist and materialist work of Gabriel Tarde. For Latour, the actor-network 
recognises the agency of material things to argue that human action is not some much a social 
practice as an assemblage of actors and actants or people and things. Ostensibly, in Latour’s 
system accords equal status to the human and the object. Latour’s work has been hugely 
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influential in contemporary sociology as the prosthesis, the actant or the assemblage 
supersede the social as the determinant of human practice. The rise of animal-human studies 
might be seen as part of this same attempt to de-centre social existence outwards onto non-
human agents. 
Sociology is in a dangerous condition, then, facing very considerable threats to its 
academic integrity. In many ways, the current challenges from individualism, biology and 
materialism echo currents of thought in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, from 
which sociology originally arose. It is not certain sociology will survive the current challenge 
as an independent discipline; already, the dissolution of sociology and sociologists into 
departments of history, business and organizational studies and politics is very evident. 
However, if sociology is to survive as a coherent discipline, the best strategy would seem to 
be to re-affirm the principles and methods which have historically been at its core. Of course, 
such a re-affirmation cannot be mere atavism. Sociology must necessarily develop. However, 
the future of sociology as an intellectual enterprise which prioritises the distinctive properties 
of the human social group as an explanatory category would seem to be predicated on a 
collective emphasis on its own traditions and theories.  
It is here that Randall Collins’ work is so important for the discipline today and, 
perhaps, to its future. From his classic work on conflict sociology in the 1970s to his most 
recent writing on interaction ritual chains and violence, Randall Collins has explicitly sought 
to fuse the insights of Max Weber and Emile Durhkeim in order to explain social order. 
Specifically, by integrating Weber’s work on the status group with Durkheim’s analysis of 
the ritual, he has sought to explain not only specific patterns of social activity but also, 
crucially, to connect micro-local practices which enduring, social structurings. The aim of 
this paper is to show explore – and to celebrate – Collins’ achievement in this domain. The 
paper intends to show how Weber and Durkheim are united in Collins’ work to generate a 
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creative synthesis which has genuine critical and analytical power. As Collins stated in his 
first major monograph, Conflict Sociology: ‘The path forward to a general explanatory theory 
is to build on Weber’s nominalist conflict approach to stratification and organizations and to 
treat any longer historical pattern as a historicist element of these elements. Durkheim is to be 
borrowed from selectively in order to round out the theory at the point of understanding the 
emotional and cognitive dynamics of interpersonal interaction’ (Collins 2004: 5). In the 
course of Collins’ work, it is possible to argue he has become more Durkheimian. Yet, the 
programme laid out in Conflict Sociology has endured.  
This synthesis still provides a hugely valuable basis for sociology in the twenty-first 
century; Weber and Durkheim – and Collins’ appropriation of them - are immediately 
relevant to the contemporary situation and to the predicament in which sociology finds itself. 
However, in the face of the existential challenges to the discipline, a mere re-statement of 
Collins’ work may be inadequate. Consequently, to highlight the indispensable contribution 
of Randall Collins to sociology and to profess the discipline at a time of deep uncertainty, the 
paper will also go onto describe how Collins’ account might be developed and augmented. 
Specifically, the paper will seek to build upon and, perhaps, refine Collins’ concept of 
Emotions and Emotional Energy, the heart of his Interaction Ritual Chain Theory, to produce 
a sociological theory which is sufficiently robust and coherent to be able to suppress the 
challenges posed by genetics, individuals and materialism. The aim of the paper is, in short, 
to reaffirm the sociological vision of Randall Collins as a framework for twenty-first century 
sociology. 
 
Interaction Ritual Chain Theory: Micro Sociology 
In order to appreciate Collins’ Interaction Ritual Chain Theory, it is necessary to situate it 
within Collins’ conflict sociology. Collins’ conflict sociology was a response to Parsonian 
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sociology which dominated American sociology until the early 1960s and which he had 
experienced as an undergraduate at Harvard. Randall Collins objected to the ‘artificial 
convergence’ which Parsons effected between Weber and Durkheim that, in Collins’ view, 
‘emasculated Weber’s theory’ (Collins 2004: 5). He sought to create a vivid sociological 
synthesis which remained true to the central precepts of the works of both masters. In order to 
do this, Collins had to move beyond Parsons’s rather contrived analysis of Weber’s concept 
of charisma to focus on the idea of the status group. For Collins, the status group was at the 
very heart of Weberian sociology and represented his most important and fertile concept.  
 In The Credential Society and Weberian Sociological Theory, Randall Collins 
describes this theory in full. In his famous definition of status groups Weber claims that 
status groups always monopolise certain ‘ideal and material goods or opportunities’. In order 
to do this, any would-be status group has to exclude others (Weber 1978: 935). The status 
group has to form itself into a unified entity, closed to outsiders. Therefore, the members of 
the group have to recognise the special relationship which binds them to each other to the 
exclusion of others; at this point, as they begin to cooperate with each other exclusively, they 
recognise their distinctively collective interests. As Weber stresses, in order for a group to 
emerge, its members have to recognise that they share something in common. The group has 
to select certain criteria of group member which all consciously recognise. These criteria are 
not imposed upon group members by prior economic facts. They are ultimately arbitrary; ‘It 
does not matter which characteristic is chosen in the individual case: whatever suggests itself 
most easily is seized upon’ (Weber 1978: 342).  They are established only insofar as the 
group itself recognise them. Lifestyle, skin-colour, language, or gender could all be used to 
distinguish group members from non-group members and, indeed, these criteria have 
historically been employed. On the basis of Weber’s relatively brief comments about status 
groups in Economy and Society, Collins constructs a sophisticated and comprehensive social 
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theory which explains the formation and dynamics of macro-social order. Ultimately, 
societies consist of a broadly stable but always conflictual hierarchy of status groups.  
Collin’s Weberian sociology is hugely fertile as a resource for understanding macro-
social order and its transformation over time. Yet, Collins remains dissatisfied with this 
Weberian theory because it lacked an adequate micro-sociology. For Collins, a sustainable 
sociology must have a theory of micro-interaction. As he notes in Conflict Sociology: 
‘Distinctively human forms of cognition and communication are built on top of the capacity 
for social ties…not the basis of them’ (Collins 2004: 55). For Collins, social interaction 
comes first; it is the point of origin both for individual capacities and social order in general, 
not the other way round. Indeed, Collins maintains rightly that no matter how large and 
complex societies become, at their foundation they can consist only of face-to-face 
interactions. This is necessarily where the action is; humans live in and through their 
interactions: ‘Everyone's life, experientially, is a sequence of microsituations, and the sum of 
all sequences of individual experience in the world would constitute all the possible 
sociological data’ (Collins 1981: 987). Later he affirmed the point: ‘Micro-situational 
encounters are the ground zero of all social action and all sociological evidence. Nothing has 
reality unless it is manifested in a situation somewhere. Macro-social structures can be real, 
provided they are patterned aggregates that hold across micro-situation, or networks of 
repeated connections from one micro-situation to another (thereby, comprising, a formal 
organization)’ (Collins 2004b: 259). The question for Collins is how is it possible for this 
almost infinite spiral of interactions to cohere into the relatively stable social order which we 
experience.  
 Durkheim becomes a critical resource for Collins because especially in his later work, 
The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, Durkheim laid out a theory of how communities 
form through their face-to-face social interaction. In Conflict Sociology, Collins observes that 
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Durkheim had asked how does a social group create a belief or call forth the Holy Spirit 
(Collins 2004: 57)? The answer is through periodic ritual congregration in heightened 
moments of collective effervescence; the creation of collective belief ‘first of all requires… a 
group of people concentrating their attention to generate a common mood’ (Collins 2004: 
58). For Collins, the emotional dimension of Durkheim’s work on ritual is absolutely critical. 
The aggregation of the group gives rise to the possibility of common beliefs but the emotions 
of personal ecstasy and collective effervescence which are cathected in the ritual invest those 
beliefs with power. As the worshippers gather to celebrate their deity, their totem becomes 
imbued with intense collective emotion. The totem radiates with intellectual and religious 
significance and simultaneously becomes the object of awe, love and respect. Electrified with 
collective emotion, the totem becomes sacred. As such, although it relies on the congregation, 
the totem is able to direct the beliefs and actions of worshippers not only in the ritual but for 
significant periods after it. Even away from the ritual, they behave in ways which are 
consistent with the beliefs which they expressed in the ritual and the emotions cathected 
there.  
 Durkheim, of course, famously focused on the aboriginal ritual. However, mobilizing 
Goffman, Collins seeks to apply the Durkheimian theory of ritual – and the central role of 
emotions in that process – to all social interaction. For Collins, as for Goffman, every social 
encounter is a mini-ritual and society ultimately consists of a complex helix of interaction 
ritual chains. Collins first discussed the concept of the interaction ritual chain in his 1981 
American Journal of Sociology article. There, the interaction ritual chain became a critical 
means of connecting micro- and macro-sociology. However, the full theory of the Interaction 
Ritual Chain was fully proposed only in 2004 with the publication of Collins’ eponymously 
titled work. There, Collins argues that an IRC consists of four elements; ‘group solidarity, 
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emotional energy, symbols that represent the group and feelings of morality (Collins 2004b: 
49). IRC theory is plainly Durkheimian. 
 According to IRC theory, interaction rituals occur whenever individuals encounter 
each other. At this moment, there is a ‘process of rhythmic coordination’, which is ‘almost 
always unconscious’ (Collins 2004b: 74). For IR to develop, ‘rhythmic entrainment’: 
‘Individuals who get into the flow of an interaction have made a series of adjustments that 
bring their rhythms together; hence they can ‘keep the beat’ with what their partner is doing 
by anticipation, rather than by reaction’ (Collins 2004b: 78). For Collins, intense emotions 
arise from this rhythmic entrainment; indeed, in many cases emotional entrainment occurs, 
where the participations in an interaction are mutually enrolled into a common emotional 
status. The participants in an interaction become happy, sad, angry or indignant together.  
 Collins’ discussion of emotional energy is both fascinating and radical. For Collins, 
humans are always striving for and driven by emotional energy; they are motivated to 
participate in interaction rituals for the emotional payoff which they accrue from them, even 
though they are not always aware of this incitement. Humans are not primarily motivated by 
material or intellectual interests in their encounters but rather by more immediate visceral 
rewards. They are driven by emotional needs and above all the requirement for emotional 
energy to engage in interaction rituals, even if they are not always fully aware of it: ‘rituals 
begin with emotional ingredients’ (Collins 2004b: 105). IRC theory explores how emotions, 
cathected in face-to-face exchange, structure the interaction ritual itself and, therefore, the 
social structure more widely. For Collins, power and emotions are mutually implicated with 
each other: ‘Power derives from a variant of the basic IR model’ (Collins 2004b: 105). 
Durkheim focused on social solidarity in rituals which produced ‘heightened mutual focus 
and bodily emotional entrainment’ (Collins 2004b: 125). By contrast, Collins is particularly 
interested in unequal rituals, where power inequalities begin to emerge: ‘Power is an 
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asymmetrical focus of attention upon such a situation, so that one side patterns on the energy 
that all the participants have mutually produced. In a power ritual, the social battery is revved 
up, but the benefit goes largely to one side’ (Collins 2004b: 125). In an unequal interaction 
ritual, the dominant party in the exchange absorbs and is empowered by the emotional energy 
to dominate social settings beyond that immediate ritual. Emotional energy coalesces into 
genuine political power and privilege. Moreover, ‘IR chains often have a circular, self-
perpetuating form. Persons who dominant rituals gain EE, which they can use to dominant 
further IRS. Persons who are at the centre of attention gain EE, which they can use to 
convene and energise still further gatherings, therefore making themselves yet again the 
centre of attention…Status group leaders re-create the energy that makes them popular’ 
(Collins 2004b: 131). As a result of their participation in interaction rituals, in which they are 
re-empowered affectively, certain individuals emerge as ‘energy stars’ in a particular milieu. 
They are the focus of emotional attention and the source of emotional energy; they animate 
and motivate others who are brought under their gravitational influence.  
For Collins, emotional dominance originates not in the individuals themselves. 
Energy stars are the situational products of interaction rituals themselves where particular 
individuals happen to occupy a privileged locus in the interaction ritual, on which collective 
attention and emotions are focused. They are then charged up necessarily with charisma: ‘My 
argument is far from holding that the upper classes are uniquely energetic individuals: they 
are products of processes that affect all of us, and in which all of us (very likely) are pretty 
much interchangeable’ (Collins 2004b: 132).  
The point is however, that once persons have been invested with emotional capital, 
once they become effervescent, they are systematically advantaged in their social encounters. 
They are winners and are able to accrue other economic and political benefits. Indeed, 
ultimately, social stratification is the macro-product of micro-agglomerations of emotional 
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energy which give particular individuals and the groups of which they are members 
systematic advantages over others: ‘In power situations, gains of emotional energy by one 
person and EE loss by the other person are reciprocally related’ (Collins 2004b: 121). 
However, in most interaction rituals, even ‘losers’ gain some emotional reward and, 
consequently, although they must defer to the energy stars, whom they have helped create, 
they are willing to participate in repeated interactions. 
Interaction Ritual Chain Theory places a huge explanatory weight on emotional 
energy – effervescence - as the decisive factor linking local encounters with broader order. 
Emotional energy binds individuals together in the interaction, producing stability there, 
multitudes of which encounters aggregate into the grand social orders of which society, 
including its status group hierarchy, is comprised. The interpersonal hierarchies established in 
the interaction are amplified outwards. Specifically, emotional energy is the means by which 
individual actions in micro-settings are articulated with the creation of status groups 
hierarchies. Effectively, the energy stars in local interactions generate local conformity in 
micro-encounters. Stable status groups coalesce from recurrent interpersonal conformity. 
Individuals are motivated to participate in rituals and to contribute to this affective solidarity 
by their own emotional needs. Consequently, the micro-groupings of which status groups are 
ultimately comprised are formulated in recurring spiral of intensely emotional social 
situations. Effervescence ties the entire hierarchy together, linking the micro- and the macro. 
 
Assessing Interaction Ritual Theory 
There is no doubt that Collins has produced a highly creative and suggestive theory which 
synthesises micro and macro. The theory is plausible; empirically, it has produced some 
fascinating and profound insights. It has been the subject of much discussion (e.g. Abbott 
1999; Munch 2005; Paget 2001; Schwalb 2007; Summers-Effler 2002; Collins 2008b); the 
 10 
concept of forward panic has already had considerable influence in the study of conflict and 
war. Yet, some refinement of it may be possible. Specifically, the linkage between emotional 
charged and emotionally motivated interaction and wider social ordering may require some 
reinforcement. It is here that the Interaction Ritual Chain Theory and above all the concept of 
emotional energy may require some development. Collins’ description of the emotional 
energy provides an explanation of how sometimes hierarchical solidarity is generated in local 
settings. Yet, while this account of how emotion plays a role in micro-social solidarity is 
compelling, it does not fully explain how individual action in the interaction ritual, generates 
or defends the collective goods of a status group more widely. The micro-macro link is not 
assured. It is no clear that emotional energy is sufficient to explain how conformity in the 
immediate social interaction amplifies out into the wider social order. Yet, this is the critical 
requirement of a theory which connects the micro and the macro. Collins must be able to 
show how micro-processes in the interaction ritual generate the collective goods on which 
enduring status groups are based.  
Interaction Ritual Chain Theory assumes that when the solidarity created around an 
energy star in the interaction ritual will be consistent with the wider status group and its 
collective interest. In an interaction ritual, subordinates will defer to the emotional energy of 
the dominant party. Consequently, they will behave in manner consistent with the interests 
and perspectives of the energy star. Since energy stars are themselves the representatives of 
specific status groups and the wider collective, by deferring to energies stars, individuals 
conform and re-affirm the wider social order. Because individuals want emotional 
gratification which only participation in the interaction ritual can give and which for most 
only deference to the energy star provides, they are motivated to conform. On the basis of 
their personal emotional requirements, individuals conform with the wider imperatives of the 
status group.  
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 Yet, at this point, Collins’ theory of emotional energy may not always identify the 
precise emotional commitments which underpin interaction. There are at least two possible 
cases when emotional energy - effervescence -  alone is not sufficient to encourage the 
conformity which is requisite to ensure the linkage between the interaction ritual and the 
status group or wider social order. Firstly, there are many cases when the dominant individual 
in a particular local setting does not generate any special local emotional energy at all. Many 
aspirant ‘energy stars’ are decidedly lacking in charisma and their followers gain very little 
emotional reward from their deference to them. Peter Drucker’s work on management is 
illuminating here. Drucker punctured many of the myths about the mystical powers of many 
of America’s most celebrated leaders like Henry Ford, Alfred Sloan or George Marshall.  
Dwight Eisenhower, George Marshall, and Harry Truman were singularly effective 
leaders, yet none possessed any more charisma than a dead mackerel. Nor did Konrad 
Adenauer, the chancellor who rebuilt West Germany after World War II. No less 
charismatic personality could be imagined than Abe Lincoln of Illinois, the raw-
boned, uncouth backwoodsman of 1860. And there was amazingly little charisma to 
the bitter, defeated, almost broken Churchill of the interwar years; what mattered was 
that he turned out in the end to have been right. (Drucker 1992: 101) 
In each of these cases, highly effective leaders who were able to enjoin collective action 
possessed little emotional energy. Their followers were not emotionally inspired. Yet, 
without coercion, they conformed. What forces were at work to enjoin their cooperation in 
the light of an absence of emotional energy? 
There is a second scenario where emotional energy does not automatically generate 
conformity. It is conceivable that in any local ritual, the participants generate intense 
emotional rewards for all the actors. The interaction ritual is very successful in emotional 
terms. However, the emotional rewards are entirely incompatible with wider organisational 
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interests which they were supposed to enforce. The interaction ritual has become a deviant 
social event in which the emotional rewards were no longer aligned with the wider collective 
interests of the society, organization or status group but only with the immediate local social 
group. This is, in fact, a danger in most social situations in which sub-culture emerge to the 
great enthusiasm of their participants but in opposition to higher social goals. It is a constant 
problem is large social organisations. A very obvious example of this occurred in Vietnam. 
There, black American soldiers adopted their own distinctive sub-culture, which involved 
distinctive patois, dress and body gestures. Black soldiers found this new solidarity 
emotionally rewarding and the solidarity was highly affective, arising from an intense sense 
of grievance and injustice (Moskos 1975). Yet, of course, while the black soldiers gained 
huge emotional energy from their participation in this subculture, they employed that energy 
not to promote the goals of the US Army but to subvert them. Disobedience, mutiny and 
ultimately the murder of their white superiors followed on from their membership of this sub-
culture. Similarly, cheats, protestors and objectors can also prioritise their own individual 
emotional rewards over conformity. They destroy rituals entirely in favour of their selfish 
emotional ends. 
Empirically, these social breaches are rare though. Normally interaction rituals pass 
off at least adequately. Yet, they are always a possibility. There is little in Collins’ Interaction 
Ritual Theory which explicitly explains why individuals do not adopt these strategies more 
regularly – or even constantly. Interaction Ritual Theory assumes that individual will 
conform with the emotional economy on offer, even though this is evidently not always the 
case. The counter-examples suggest something important. Collins’ theory is certainly not 
wrong but something is missing. There is some other motivating factor suffusing interaction 
rituals and taking precedence over effervescence; otherwise in the face of an emotionally 
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unfavourable interaction, humans would regularly choose to rebel and to deviate. The 
question is: what are these mechanisms? 
 
Reconstructing IR Theory: shame and honour 
Randall Collins’ work is heavily influenced by Erving Goffman’s sociology and, in fact, that 
corpus of work offers an approach to rehabilitate Interaction Ritual Theory. The goal of 
Goffman’s interactionist sociology was to provide an ethnography of modern western 
society. Goffman effectively wanted to create an anthropology of western and especially 
American culture to show how social order was maintained through the tiny and apparently 
irrelevant micro-practices of everyday life. Goffman explicitly denied that there were any 
universals in these encounters: ‘From the fact that greetings are found among many higher 
primates, as well as any number of preliterate societies and all civilised ones, it would be 
easy to conclude that something like access rituals are universally found in societies. But, of 
course, universals are exactly what good ethnography brings into doubt’ (Goffman 1971: 93). 
However, while the empirics might be cultural and historically specific, he believed he had 
identified a fundamental mechanism which underpinned all social interaction – and indeed 
social order: ‘The person tends to conduct himself during an encounter so as to maintain both 
his own face and the face of the other participants’ (Goffman 1967: 11). No matter what the 
situation, humans are concerned to preserve their credibility in the eyes of those with whom 
they are immediately interacting. The maintenance of face is an index of cooperation and a 
connotes the trust participants have invested in each other in an interaction. Very intense 
emotions are, therefore, attached to the preservation of one’s own and others’ faces; visceral 
embarrassment and shame typically follow a major defacement when cooperation breaks 
down for accidental or intentional reasons.  
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 The significance of Goffman’s work can be highlighted when it is considered 
alongside Solomon Asch’s conformity experiments, especially as discussed by Thomas 
Scheff. Asch’ conformity experiments are well-known and there is no need to discuss their 
particularities at length. In a series of ingenious experiments, Asch sought to show by a series 
of simple collective test how susceptible the members of a group were to its collective 
pressures. Humans want to conform, even in situations where they, as individuals, must 
objectively know that the position to which they were consenting is objectively incorrect. 
Thus, many of Asch’s subject agreed to simple mathematical calculations which were 
manifestly wrong to the differential line lengths which were clearly perceptually inaccurate. 
The rationale his subjects subsequently gave for their irrational conformity was instructive: ‘I 
felt like a silly fool…A question of being a misfit…they’d think I was queer. It made me 
seem weak-eyed or weak-headed, like a black sheep’ (Scheff 1988: 403). Subjects were 
worried by the prospect of being singled out by the group as an outsider and, therefore, 
shamed by their peers. A visceral sense of shame drove them to conform. In his discussions 
of shame, Scheff plausibly describes the ubiquity of shame, operating quite universally across 
social life, unseen and subtly encouraging even demanding conformity: ‘I propose that the 
degree and type of deference and attendant emotions of pride and shame make up a subtle 
and pervasive system of social sanctions’ (Scheff 1988: 396). He continues: ‘The deference-
emotion system functions virtually continuously, even when we are alone’ (Scheff 1988: 
396). Just as Goffman argues that embarrassment operations constantly through social life, 
enjoining individuals to interact predictably with each other, so Scheff claims that shame 
drives individuals to conform.  
Individuals who behave well in interaction gain the respect of their interlocutors and 
accrue emotional rewards for this congeniality. Goffman – and Scheff – highlight the role of 
shame – and honour – as an underlying motivational force in all human social interaction. 
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Humans are compelled as individuals and groups to fear and avoid shame and desire honour. 
They are also well aware of the reasons for this fear of shame – which Asch’s subject 
highlighted with great clarity. Non-conformity – and the shame it induces - brings exclusion. 
As Asch noted: ‘They were dominated by their exclusion from the group which they took to 
be a reflection on themselves. Essentially they were unable to face a conflict, which 
threatened in some undefined way, to expose deficiency in themselves. They were 
consequently trying to merge into the group in order not to feel peculiar’ (Scheff 1988: 403). 
A shamed individual is initially disdained, rebuked or ridiculed but ultimately shaming 
involves exclusion. Of course, the exclusion might be temporary or partial. Indeed, in most 
groups this is precisely what occurs. A member behaves badly, acting out of line with the 
group’s interest and values. This person is cautioned by the group and, often, cooperation is 
temporarily withheld; a reprobate is sent to Coventry or denied some routine benefits of 
group membership. Eventually, a transgression is forgiven and the perpetrator is re-
incorporated. However, in some cases, the shaming processes leads to extended or permanent 
expulsion.  
It is often easy to assume that the shame/embarrassment mechanism of which 
Goffman and Scheff speak is simply referring to an emotional pressure. Humans simply do 
not like the feeling of embarrassment/shame and so avoid it. Certainly, the emotion of shame 
is among the most powerful which humans can experience. It is intense. The purely 
emotional power of shame is real and, of course, it is precisely its visceral character which 
Collins describes so well in his work. However, although shame is a powerful emotion, the 
power of shame is not merely affective. There is an actual dimension which it represents and 
enforces: exclusion. A shamed individual is excluded temporarily or permanently from the 
group. The shamed, therefore, lose their access to the group, their fellow members and all the 
benefits which it and they offer. The mechanisms of shame and honour are the means by 
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which groups control access to their collective goods. In some cases, these goods are trivial: 
entertainment or amusement. Yet, often collective goods are critical; they refer to economic 
opportunities, professional careers, health, food, water and, ultimately, even personal 
security. Because all individuals want and need collective goods, shame and honour motivate 
group members to cooperate with their fellows because contributing to the collective good 
earns honour and, therefore, tangible reward, while negating the collective good is 
condemned with shame. 
It is at this point, when the mechanisms of shame and honour are recognised, that 
Collins Interaction Ritual Theory genuinely begins to connect the micro- and the macro. It is 
possible to see how face-to-face interactions can actually generate and, indeed, enforce 
conformity, even when there is little emotional motivation to comply. Individuals routinely 
act responsibly, even though it is inconvenient, tiring and boring to do so, because only their 
continued cooperation will ensure access to collective goods, on which they depend. Marshall 
and Lincoln may have been very dull individuals but, as leaders, they offered their 
subordinates a goal – military victory - from which they collectively benefited and, although 
not inspiring, they were scrupulous in their fairness towards them. Consequently, in the long 
and short-term, their followers were rewarded with important collective goods through their 
subservience, despite the lack of immediate emotional reward.  
Active deviance is similarly restricted by established mechanisms of shame and 
honour and the allegiances which are built around it. Sub-group deviance is always an 
eminent possibility in any human community, as black American soldiers showed in 
Vietnam; it probably increases in proportion to the size of the group. However, because large 
social groups and organisations have material rewards to offer their members (always 
attached to the emotional-deference system of honour and shame), it is often hard for a sub-
cultural deviance to emerge and establish itself. The threat of shame and expulsion raises the 
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costs of membership of any prospective deviant group. It is true that deviant individuals can 
generate immediate emotional excitement, especially in the moment of breaching. When 
employees stage dramatic resignations, sports players cheat spectacularly, or a person is 
egregiously rude in an encounter, it generates intense effervescence.  
Sometimes, deviant groups develop lasting and concrete collective goods for their 
would-be members. Black soldiers in Vietnam certainly achieved this. However, these goods 
are often less secure and attractive than those which are already proffered by the existing 
order. It is very difficult for would-be resistant groups to generate new sub-organisational 
solidarities and to attach shame and honour mechanisms to these groupings and the goods 
they offer.  Consequently, although individuals can always theoretically mobilise themselves 
into new deviant interest groups, in routine social life, individuals tend to conform because 
the costs are often simply too high, even if they might earn very significant immediate 
emotional reward from breaching a social interaction. The effervescence of rebellion is often 
quite evanescent, leaving an individual excluded and marginalised, denied access to existing 
collective resources without providing an avenue to new ones.  
Effervescence is real and it is an important dimension of social life, then. It does bind 
individuals together; it imbues collective goals, norms, ideas and values with a unique moral 
focus. However, alone it does not necessarily enjoin the level of conformity which routinely 
characterises social life. An alternative emotional mechanism operates to engender 
cooperation in micro-settings; shame and honour, rather than effervescence alone, underpin 
social interaction precisely because they immediately correlated to access to collective goods. 
Indeed, effervescence is usually subordinate to and dependent upon the processes of mutual 
shaming and honouring. Typically, effervescence reaches its highest point in interactions 
when all the participants are cooperating with each other seamlessly to generate highly 
valuable collective goods. At this point, knowing they are helping each other, bound in 
 18 
intense relations of trust, and recognising and honouring each other for their contributions, 
they achieve the heightened emotional state which Collins so brilliantly analyses.  
  
Conclusion 
The work of Randall Collins spans five decades from 1970 to 2020. It represents a major 
achievement and a huge contribution to sociology today. In that work, Collins has sought to 
effect a highly original and creative synthesis of the work of Weber and Durkheim in order to 
connect micro and macro-levels. It is an ambitious project. Against the individualism, 
biological and technological determinism of psychologists, economists and even sociologists, 
Collins affirms the central importance specifically social interaction. Collins demonstrates 
that human social interaction and the groups which arise from it has unique, inalienable 
properties which determine individual and collective practice. His aim is to try and describe 
those processes in detail and to elaborate them through rich and wide-ranging empirical 
example. 
 The endeavour is admirable. However, in order to reinforce Collins’ project and to 
defend sociology against its enemies, this paper has suggested that it might be possible to 
develop Collins’ work and, above all, his Interaction Ritual Theory. Specifically, the paper 
argues that while Collins is absolutely right to focus on emotions, his formulation of 
emotional energy in IR theory might be refined. Collins is surely right to claim that 
effervescence is a vital dimension of human social life. Humans inevitably create some kind 
of effervescence in their social interactions; the moods created in company are always 
different from those expressed in solitude and, of course, there are certain emotions which are 
impossible to reproduce alone. Effervescence unites individuals – and motivates them to 
interact and cooperate – and it invests shared symbols with common meaning and force. 
Consequently effervescence is critical to social action. However, although effervescence can 
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be enough sometimes to motivate participation and conformity, the possibility always exists 
that it will be insufficient. In practice, many crucial social encounters deliver few emotional 
rewards. It is mysterious why anyone would be motivated to conform and to behave in a way 
which contributes to long term existence of a status group, when the immediate pay-off is so 
poor. Moreover, in any social setting, a participant might pursue other emotional ends and 
destroy the interaction in order to gratify selfish affective interests. In this case, they would 
also undermine the long-term production of exclusive goods for a stauts group. Effervescence 
is typically involved in interaction and in status group formation but, on its own, it does not 
necessarily compel individuals to cooperate and to contribute to the collective goods on 
which status groups are based. 
Some further force must underpin and support pure effervescence which drives 
humans not only to want to gain emotional rewards but conformity, even if it means others 
will get larger emotional rewards. This paper has argued that interaction rituals are, in fact, 
underpinned not merely by pure effervescence but by the more robust mechanisms of shame 
and honour. The fear of shame and embarrassment, and the desire for recognition and 
reputation impel individuals to cooperate in interactions. These are the master emotions. 
Shame and honour work ubiquitously and universally through all social interactions and 
individuals instinctively internalise them to monitor their own and others’ actions. Moreover, 
shame and honour are not merely affective – although they are intense emotions. Shame and 
honour are explicitly and inexorable tied to an individual’s standing in a group and, therefore, 
to that individual’s access to its exclusive collective goods. Humans fear shame not simply 
because they are psychological vulnerable but because exclusion follows it. There is a very 
real cost to be born for being shamed. The cooperation and company of once beloved fellows 
is denied and the goods which that group monopolised are now denied. Shame and honour 
crucially tie behaviour in the here and now to the standards and interests of the status group 
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and the social order in the longer term. Doctors, lawyers, aircrew, workers and criminals are 
obliged to behave in line with the interests of their respective group affiliations in every 
micro-interaction, if they are to enjoy the full benefits of group membership.  
The addition of the mechanism of shame and honour to Randall Collins theory is not a 
major revision. It is an amendment in line with the general content and intent of Collins’ 
work. However, by recognising the role of shame and honour in social life more explicitly, it 
is possible to delineate the precise mechanism which connects the face-to-face interaction to 
the enduring social orders status group hierarchies more fully. By enjoining cooperation in 
micro-setting, shame and honour play an important role in stabilizing social groups and 
ultimately the entire social order. As such, shame and honour affirm the Durkheimian and 
Weberian traditions of the discipline and resolutely reject the current trends towards 
individualism and determinism. Under the concept of shame and honour, all human action is 
necessarily social and human social interaction involves unique processes and possesses 
distinctive causal powers.  
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